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OPINION OF THE COURT

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
In this appeal we consider whether a vehicle stop based
on information provided by a witness who called 911 to report
a shooting violated Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). As we
shall explain, the vehicle stop was supported by reasonable
suspicion that at least one of its occupants was involved in the
2

shooting.
In addition, the police officers’ conduct in
effectuating the stop was reasonable under the circumstances.
Accordingly, the District Court did not err when it denied
Appellant Anthony Johnson’s motion to suppress evidence.
I.
A hard rain was falling in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on
the night of January 7, 2007 when Tammy Anderson noticed a
taxicab pull into a parking lot across the street from her house
and park next to a van. Though visibility was poor, Anderson
was able to observe what appeared to be two men emerge from
the vehicles and begin to fight. Watching this altercation
develop from the doorway of her home, Anderson heard at least
one gunshot ring out.
Upon hearing the gunshot, Anderson called 911 and told
the police dispatcher: “I heard a gunshot. I seen [sic] two people
wrestling on the ground and I don’t see them now. And there
was a gunshot. I’m standing here on [sic] my front door.”
When prompted by the dispatcher, Anderson provided her full
name, her telephone number, and described the location of the
parking lot. Although Anderson was unable to describe in any
detail the individuals involved in the altercation, she said the
taxi appeared to be white— possibly with tan paneling—and had
a green light on its roof. While she was still on the phone,
Anderson told the dispatcher that the taxi was departing from
the parking lot and heading southbound on Seventh Street. The
van, Anderson noted, remained in the lot and appeared to be
unattended.
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The information Anderson provided was dispatched to
Harrisburg police officers on patrol that evening. Officer John
Doll responded to the parking lot and confirmed that a van was
parked in the lot. Doll arrived so quickly that Anderson, who
was still on the phone, told the dispatcher that she saw a police
car drive by. At about the same time, another officer reported
that he had spotted a taxicab matching the description provided
by Anderson heading southbound on Seventh Street
approximately ten blocks away. After determining that no one
remained with the van, Officer Doll proceeded southbound on
Seventh Street in search of the taxicab.
Doll quickly tracked down the taxi, though he did not
stop the vehicle immediately. Concerned that its occupants
might be armed, Doll and other officers followed the taxi for
several blocks to allow backup to join the pursuit. When the
taxi turned onto Aberdeen Street, a narrow alleyway
approximately two miles from the reported altercation, the
officers initiated a traffic stop. The purpose of this stop, Doll
testified at the suppression hearing, was to investigate the “shots
fired call” and to ensure that no one in the taxicab was either
armed or injured. Positioning their vehicles to block the exit to
the alleyway, numerous officers surrounded the taxicab.
Because the information relayed by the dispatcher indicated that
the occupants of the taxi may have been involved in the reported
shooting incident, the officers approached the taxicab slowly,
with guns drawn, while shouting for the occupants to exit the
vehicle. According to Doll, such a response was “general
practice” in such circumstances “in case somebody comes out of
the vehicle with a gun ready to shoot.”
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The police proceeded to clear and secure the vehicle.
Riding in the backseat of the taxi with his young son was the
Appellant, Anthony Johnson. After removing both Johnson and
the taxi driver, Kenneth Cobb, the officers handcuffed both men,
though neither was formally arrested at that time. Rather,
Officer Doll testified at the suppression hearing that the police
handcuffed the men so the officers could safely clear the vehicle
and gather information about the shooting reported by
Anderson. Surprised to discover Johnson’s eight-year-old son
in the taxicab, the officers also removed him and placed him to
the side.
After Johnson and Cobb were detained, another
responding officer, Richard Gibney, approached the car.
Though it was raining hard, the location was well-lighted and
the taxicab’s interior dome light was on, illuminating the
vehicle’s passenger compartment. Looking through a back
window, Officer Gibney observed the butt of a Taurus .38
Special revolver protruding from an unzipped duffel bag on the
taxicab’s rear seat, where Johnson had been sitting. After
consulting with Officer Doll, Officer Gibney retrieved the
weapon from the taxi and unloaded it, finding two spent shell
casings inside.
Officer Doll then placed Johnson, a convicted felon,
under arrest for possession of the gun and suspected
involvement in the shooting and altercation reported by
Anderson. After reading Johnson his Miranda rights, Doll
began questioning him about the firearm and the shooting.
Johnson declined to respond. A search of Johnson incident to
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his arrest revealed that he carried on his person marijuana,
cocaine, and related drug paraphernalia.
Johnson was transported to the police station for booking,
where he again encountered Officer Doll, who had traveled to
the station separately. Although Doll did not attempt to question
Johnson at the police station, Johnson began speaking to Doll
during the booking process, admitting ownership of the revolver
and duffel bag but denying responsibility for the shooting
reported by Anderson. Johnson also attempted to persuade Doll
to forego charging him with any drug offenses.
A grand jury indicted Johnson on a single count of illegal
possession of a firearm by a person with three prior felony
convictions in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).
After Johnson pleaded not guilty, the Government filed a
superseding indictment, adding a single count of possession with
the intent to distribute marijuana and cocaine in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Johnson then filed the motion to suppress
at issue in this appeal, contending that the firearm, drugs, and
any inculpatory statements made to Doll should be suppressed
because the initial stop of the taxicab violated the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. After the District Court denied his motion, Johnson
conditionally pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)
and 924(e), reserving his right to appeal the District Court’s
denial of his motion to suppress. The District Court sentenced
Johnson to 180 months incarceration and imposed a fine of
$1,000, together with four years of supervised release.
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II.
Johnson now appeals the District Court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
On appeal, Johnson claims the initial stop of the taxi was
unconstitutional for two independent reasons. First, he argues
that the stop of the taxi amounted to a de facto arrest which
required probable cause that the information provided by
Anderson could not provide. Alternatively, Johnson argues that
the stop of the taxicab was not supported by reasonable
suspicion because the information provided by Anderson was
insufficiently detailed, particularized, and reliable. Examining
the District Court’s factual findings for clear error, United States
v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 2004), and exercising de
novo review over the District Court’s legal determination that
the seizure at issue here did not violate the Fourth Amendment,
United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)), we address
Johnson’s arguments in turn.
III.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches
and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop of a
motor vehicle is a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653 (1979); United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249,
253 (3d Cir. 2006). Ordinarily, “for a seizure to be reasonable
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under the Fourth Amendment, it must be effectuated with a
warrant based on probable cause.” United States v. Robertson,
305 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2002). Under the well-established
exception to the warrant requirement set forth in Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968), however, “an officer may, consistent with the
Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the
officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123
(2000); see also Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (stop of vehicle must
be based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). Evidence
obtained as the result of a “Terry stop” “that does not meet this
exception must be suppressed as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’”
United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)).
A.
Johnson first contends that the evidence recovered from
the taxicab and his statements to the police must be suppressed
because the initial stop of the vehicle was not supported by
probable cause.1 Though Johnson acknowledges that police
officers ordinarily may stop a vehicle based on reasonable
suspicion alone, see Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663; United States v.
Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995), he argues that
probable cause was required here because the manner in which
the stop was conducted transformed the encounter into a formal

1

Johnson does not contend that the statements he made
during this interaction with Officer Doll should be suppressed
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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arrest. Specifically, Johnson notes that the police encircled the
taxicab, drew their weapons, yelled at the occupants, and later
handcuffed Johnson and Cobb without first questioning them or
checking their identification.
In certain circumstances, it can be difficult to distinguish
between a Terry stop, which requires only reasonable suspicion,
and a de facto arrest, which must be supported by probable
cause. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685
(1985) (observing that case law “may in some instances create
difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an
investigative stop from a de facto arrest”). We do not find
Johnson’s appeal to present such a case, however. We have
recognized that “the vast majority of courts have held that police
actions in blocking a suspect’s vehicle and approaching with
weapons ready, and even drawn, does not constitute an arrest per
se.” United States v. Edwards, 53 F.3d 616, 619 (3d Cir. 1995)
(collecting cases). Nor does placing a suspect in handcuffs
while securing a location or conducting an investigation
automatically transform an otherwise-valid Terry stop into a
full-blown arrest. Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1193
(3d Cir. 1993) (“There is no per se rule that pointing guns at
people, or handcuffing them, constitutes an arrest.”); Torres v.
United States, 200 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[I]n certain
circumstances officers lawfully may handcuff the occupants of
the premises while executing a search warrant.”).
We likewise find unpersuasive Johnson’s argument that
the stop constituted a de facto arrest because the police did not
question the taxi’s occupants or check their identification before
ordering them from the vehicle and handcuffing them. In
9

Terry, the Supreme Court recognized that “it would be
unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary
risks in the performance of their duties.” 392 U.S. at 23.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court noted:
When an officer is justified in believing that the
individual whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating . . . is armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or to others, it would . . .
be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the
power to take necessary measures to determine
whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon
and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.
Id. at 24. Here, the Harrisburg police, acting on a credible tip
that at least one of the taxi’s occupants was armed and
dangerous, took reasonable steps to ensure that the scene was
secure before investigating further. See Part III.B–C, infra.
That the police did not first engage the taxi’s occupants in
conversation or check their driver’s licenses did not transform
the stop into a de facto arrest.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that nothing about
the conduct of the Harrisburg police in this case rises to the level
that we have previously required to constitute a de facto arrest
under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we decline
Johnson’s invitation to subject the stop of the taxicab to the
probable cause standard. Instead, we will evaluate whether the
Harrisburg police had reasonable suspicion to stop the taxi and
question its occupants regarding the shooting reported by
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Anderson. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663; Johnson, 63 F.3d at
245.
B.
Having ascertained the appropriate legal standard, we
now consider the primary issue presented in Johnson’s appeal:
whether the District Court erred when it held that the Terry stop
of the taxicab was supported by reasonable suspicion. Terry,
392 U.S. at 19-20; see also United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464
F.3d 392, 397 (3d Cir. 2006) (reaffirming that the Terry
reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops).
Johnson argues that it was not, contending that Anderson’s 911
call provided the Harrisburg police with insufficient information
to justify an investigative stop. When assessing whether the
vehicle stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, we must
consider the “totality of the circumstances to determine whether
‘the detaining officers . . . [had] a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity.’” United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir.
2006) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18
(1981)). In assessing whether the officers’ suspicions regarding
the taxicab and its occupants were based on sufficiently reliable
facts, the knowledge of the dispatcher to whom Anderson made
her report “is imputed to the officers in the field.” United States
v. Torres, 534 F.3d 207, 210 (3d Cir. 2008).
Here, the stop of the taxi and the seizure of its occupants
were based almost exclusively on the information Anderson
provided to the police. When a Terry stop is based on a tip
provided by an informant, we must scrutinize the informant’s
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“veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge” to determine
whether the information relied upon by the police was sufficient
to establish reasonable suspicion for the stop. Id. (quoting
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Several factors inform our assessment of the
reliability of an informant’s tip, including whether:
(1) the information was provided to the police in
a face-to-face interaction, allowing an officer to
assess directly the informant’s credibility;
(2) the informant can be held responsible if her
allegations are untrue;
(3) the information would not be available to the
ordinary observer;
(4) the informant has recently witnessed the
criminal activity at issue; and
(5) the witness’s information accurately predicts
future activity.
See id. at 211 (citing Brown, 448 F.3d at 249-50). Though these
factors all are relevant to our analysis, no single factor is
dispositive or even necessary to render an informant’s tip
reliable. Id. at 213 (“[A] tip need not bear all of the indicia—or
even any particular indicium—to supply reasonable suspicion.”).
Thus, we must look to the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether Anderson’s 911 call had “sufficient indicia
of reliability . . . for us to conclude that the officers possessed an
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objectively reasonable suspicion” to justify the stop of the cab.
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18; Brown, 448 F.3d at 250.
Evaluating the totality of the circumstances in this case,
we have little trouble concluding that the stop was supported by
reasonable suspicion. Anderson—an innocent, uninvolved
bystander—called 911 to report an ongoing altercation that
involved gunfire. Though she did not speak face-to-face with a
police officer, she freely and repeatedly provided the police
dispatcher with her name and telephone number, and the
location of her home. These data points enhanced Anderson’s
credibility and the reliability of her report by allowing the police
to hold her responsible if her tip ultimately proved false. See
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000); United States v.
Nelson, 284 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2002). Indeed, the
information Anderson provided here was more detailed than in
Torres, where we noted that an informant’s reliability was
enhanced because he identified himself by telling a police
dispatcher “that he was driving a green taxicab from a specified
company.” 534 F.3d at 212.
The details of Anderson’s 911 call also made clear that
she was reporting not just recent, but ongoing criminal activity
that she was observing during her emergency call. See Nelson,
284 F.3d at 480. This allowed the police to conclude that
Anderson had a reliable basis—namely, her eyewitness
observations—for the information she was relaying to the
dispatcher. See United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 354
(officers’ knowledge that informant was “reporting what he had
observed moments ago” enhanced reliability of tip); Torres, 534
F.3d at 211 (that detailed tip was relayed to 911 dispatcher in
13

“play-by-play” fashion supported finding of reliability).
Anderson’s tip also described the color of the taxicab and noted
that it had a distinctive green light on top.2 See White, 496 U.S.
at 332 (level of detail of information provided can enhance an
informant’s credibility); Nelson, 284 F.3d at 483 (detailed
information regarding, model, color, and other distinctive
characteristics of vehicle supported reliability of information
provided by anonymous informant). Finally, Anderson correctly
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In its analysis of whether the police possessed
reasonable suspicion to stop the taxi, the District Court credited
the information provided by Anderson in part because she
accurately “described [the cab’s] most distinctive feature—the
green light.” App. at 138. Johnson now argues that the stop of
the taxi was not supported by reasonable suspicion because
while Anderson indicated that the taxi she observed had a green
roof light, the taxi in which he rode had a white roof light.
Appellant’s Op. Br. at 19. When questioned on this point at the
suppression hearing, the taxi driver, Kenneth Cobb, was far
from certain, testifying that he “assum[ed] it was a white light”
and indicating that he “didn’t recall it being green or anything
like that.” App. at 103. Conversely, testimony from the officers
involved in the stop suggested that the taxicab’s roof light was,
in fact, green. App. at 69-70. Given Cobb’s equivocal
suggestion that the light was actually white, coupled with the
fact that Cobb and Johnson were longtime friends and coworkers who had served prison time together, App. at 103-05,
the District Court’s decision to reject Cobb’s description of the
color of the light was not clearly erroneous. See Bonner, 363
F.3d at 215.
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noted that the taxi would be heading south on Seventh Street,
which is exactly where it was first spotted by the police. See
White, 496 U.S. at 332 (reliability of tip enhanced because it
accurately predicted defendant’s future behavior); Torres, 534
F.3d at 212 (reliability of tip supported by fact that it accurately
predicted that a particular type of vehicle would be driving near
a certain location).
The reliability of an informant’s tip can be enhanced
further by independent police corroboration of the information
provided. White, 496 U.S. at 329-31. Here, important aspects
of Anderson’s tip were corroborated by the police. After
describing the altercation to the 911 dispatcher, for example,
Anderson reported that although the taxicab had departed, the
van remained parked in the lot. This information was confirmed
by Officer Doll, who drove by the lot and observed the
unattended van before proceeding down Seventh Street to
intercept the taxicab.
Furthermore, the 911 operator
corroborated some of the details of Anderson’s initial report,
testifying at the suppression hearing that she was very familiar
with the area Anderson was describing. And finally, the police
also confirmed that a white taxi with a green light on its roof
was traveling southbound on Seventh Street, just as Anderson
had stated. That the police were only able to corroborate
innocent details of Anderson’s tip is immaterial. See United
States v. Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 272 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The police
corroboration of the anonymous tip’s innocent details, the cases
teach, bolsters the veracity and reliability of the tip . . . .”). The
police’s corroboration of certain aspects of Anderson’s tip
further enhanced the reliability of the information that she
provided to the police.
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In claiming that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to
stop the taxi, Johnson relies principally on the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jaquez,
421 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). In Jaquez, an officer
received a report indicating only that “a red car” had been
involved in a shooting in a high-crime neighborhood. 421 F.3d
at 340. Approximately fifteen minutes later, the officer stopped
a red car traveling away from the general area where the shots
reportedly had been fired. Id. A consent search revealed that
the car’s driver, a convicted felon, was carrying a loaded
firearm. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of
the defendant’s motion to suppress the firearm, noting that the
officer had no information tying the stopped vehicle to the
reported shooting other than the car’s color and general location.
Such “sparse and broadly generic information,” the court
concluded, was insufficient to provide the officer with the
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the initial stop of the
defendant’s vehicle. Id. at 341.
The detailed information reported by Anderson—coupled
with the officers’ independent corroboration of certain aspects
of her tip—plainly distinguishes this appeal from Jaquez.
Unlike the report in Jaquez, Anderson’s description of the
vehicle was specific, providing the police with both the color
and type of car involved in the shooting—a white taxi cab—and
identifying one of its most distinctive features, a green roof
light. See Nelson, 284 F.3d at 481 (reasonable suspicion existed
for stop partly because a “gray BMW with a tag in the back
window . . . matched precisely” the information relayed to
officers); cf. Jaquez, 421 F.3d at 341 (finding that officer lacked
reasonable suspicion in part because the tip provided no
16

information regarding the “make or model” of the stopped
vehicle). The sparse tip in Jaquez also lacked any predictive
value, indicating only that a particular color car was in a certain
neighborhood fifteen minutes prior to the stop. Here, by
contrast, Anderson accurately predicted that the taxicab would
be traveling south on Seventh Street. See Torres, 534 F.3d at
212 (tip indicating that a car of a certain make and color would
be driving in a particular location provided reasonable suspicion
to stop the vehicle because it “accurately predicted what would
follow”). Moreover, the taxi in which Johnson was riding was
spotted and stopped just minutes after Anderson’s 911 call was
initiated, much sooner than the stop of the car in Jaquez. And
finally, unlike Jaquez, Anderson's 911 call was more than a
mere tip. As we noted previously, it was an eyewitness account
provided by one who gave her name and could be held
responsible if the information was untrue. Accordingly,
Johnson’s attempt to analogize the detailed and predictive
information provided by Anderson to the bare-bones tip found
lacking by the Fifth Circuit in Jaquez is unavailing.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude that Anderson’s tip, bolstered by the officers’
independent corroboration of certain details, was sufficiently
reliable to provide the police with reasonable suspicion that the
occupants of the taxicab in which Johnson was riding had been
involved in the shooting reported by Anderson. Therefore, we
hold that the officers’ decision to stop the taxi was “justified at
its inception” in the present case. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20.
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C.
A Terry stop that is supported by reasonable suspicion at
the outset may nonetheless violate the Fourth Amendment if it
is excessively intrusive in its scope or manner of execution.
United States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 366 (3d Cir. 1984); see
also Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 (“The manner in which the seizure
and search were conducted is, of course, as vital a part of the
inquiry as whether they were warranted at all.”). As discussed
previously, Johnson devotes most of his brief to arguing that the
officers’ conduct subjected him to a de facto arrest that was
unsupported by probable cause. See Part III.A, supra.
However, an excessively intrusive Terry stop is not
unconstitutional because its overly broad scope necessarily
places a suspect under de facto arrest without probable cause, as
Johnson suggests here. Rather, an improperly executed Terry
stop violates the Fourth Amendment because its scope is
generally unreasonable under all of the circumstances. See
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20; Baker, 50 F.3d at 1192 (“Under the
Terry cases, the reasonableness of the intrusion is the touchstone
. . . .”).
Recognizing this, the Supreme Court in Terry
emphasized that “our inquiry is a dual one” when assessing the
constitutionality of an investigative detention such as the one at
issue in this case. 392 U.S. at 19-20. First, we examine
“whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception”—that
is, whether the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion at
the outset. Id. In the present case, it clearly was. See Part III.B,
supra. Next, we determine whether the manner in which the
stop was conducted “was reasonably related in scope to the
18

circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20; see also Goodrich, 450 F.3d at 558,
558 n.6 (explaining that the “validity of the initial stop” and the
“reasonableness or intrusiveness of the investigation” require
separate analyses).
Here, Johnson misdirects his criticism of the police
officers’ conduct when he argues under step one that he was
subjected to a de facto arrest by the Harrisburg police. Our
cases indicate, however, that such complaints are more properly
considered during the second step of the Terry analysis, when
we scrutinize the relative intrusiveness of the officers’ conduct.
See, e.g., Edwards, 53 F.3d at 619 (analyzing defendant’s
argument that he was subject to a de facto arrest during Terry
stop by considering the reasonableness of the stop in light of the
circumstances that justified it). Thus, we review the manner in
which the Harrisburg police conducted the Terry stop at issue
here to determine whether it was reasonably related in scope to
the initial justification for the stop and the officers’ legitimate
concerns for the safety of themselves and the general public.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 24-25; Sharp, 470 U.S. at 685-87.
In Terry, the Supreme Court emphasized that a police
officer conducting an investigative stop has an “immediate
interest . . . in taking steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.” 392 U.S. at 23.
Accordingly, when an officer has a reasonable basis for
“believing that the individual . . . is armed and presently
dangerous,” he may “take necessary measures to determine
whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize
19

the threat of physical harm.” Id. Ultimately, our scrutiny of the
Harrisburg police officers’ actions in stopping the cab and
removing its occupants must focus on the overall reasonableness
of their conduct in light of all the circumstances. Edwards, 53
F.3d at 619; Baker, 50 F.3d at 1192 (“Under the Terry cases, the
reasonableness of the intrusion is the touchstone . . . .”).
Johnson’s chief complaint regarding the manner in which
the stop was executed is that the police officers surrounded the
vehicle, drew their weapons, shouted at the taxicab’s occupants,
and subsequently handcuffed both him and Cobb. We have
previously recognized that the “use of guns and handcuffs must
be justified by the circumstances” that authorize an investigative
detention in the first place. Baker, 50 F.3d at 1193. This
requirement was clearly met in the instant case. The officers
responding to Anderson’s 911 call reasonably suspected that the
taxi’s occupants had been involved in a physical altercation and
shooting just minutes before. See Part III.B, supra. An officer
with reasonable suspicion that the occupants of a vehicle are
armed and dangerous does not act unreasonably by drawing his
weapon, ordering the occupants out of the vehicle, and
handcuffing them until the scene is secured. See, e.g., United
States v. Hastomir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989)
(finding that police officers with reasonable suspicion that
suspects were armed acted reasonably in drawing their weapons
and handcuffing suspects). Nor are we troubled by the fact that
the officers shouted at the taxicab’s occupants. See Baker, 50
F.3d at 1192 (noting that police may order a suspect to “get
down” during a Terry stop). Because the officers had specific,
reliable facts indicating that at least one of the taxicab’s
occupants had been involved in a shooting just minutes before,
20

the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that a Terry stop be
conducted in a reasonable manner was clearly met.
In sum, the Harrisburg police officers took only “such
steps as were reasonably necessary to protect their personal
safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the
stop.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985);
Edwards, 53 F.3d at 619. We therefore conclude that the Terry
stop of the taxicab in which Johnson was a passenger, in
addition to being supported by reasonable suspicion, was also
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the [stop] in the first place.” Terry, 391 U.S. at 19-20.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court did not err
when it held that Johnson’s Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated. Accordingly, we will affirm Johnson’s judgment of
conviction.
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